By Edward Ring, Director of Water and Energy Policy at the California Policy Center
The short answer is no. Never.
What is happening with the Sites Reservoir is a case study in why, if the people running California today were in charge in the 1950s and 1960s, the California Water Project would never have been built. This reservoir, approved by voters in 2014, could have been built by now. As it is, the proposal is beset by ongoing and escalating challenges. Between oblivion and realization, the best odds for Sites are probably no better than even.
Most prominent recent news about Sites is the latest official cost estimate, which has risen to $6.8 billion. This should come as no surprise, but it changes the cost/benefit equation. While we offered some ROI data on Sites in early July, it’s useful to revisit this not only in light of the new costs, but to explore in further depth the other primary variable affecting ROI, which is how much water will actually end up in the hands of water contractors for agricultural and urban consumption.
It’s true of course that a cost increase from the officially recognized estimate of $3.9 billion to $6.8 billion is significant. For any calculation anyone has previously made, bump the numbers by 74 percent. That’s huge.
But even more significant, and not acknowledged nearly enough, is the endless war between proponents of the Sites Project, who steadfastly claim the reservoir will deliver an average annual yield of 250,000 acre feet per year to paying customers, and opponents, who argue that the average annual yield could fall as low as 22,000 acre feet per year.
Before going any further, imagine a scenario where the Sites Reservoir comes in on budget at a construction cost of $6.8 billion, but endless lawfare reduces the yield to what some of its opponents claim as a plausible outcome. A bond issued for 6.8 billion at 4 percent on a 30 year term will require an annual payment of $393 million. That amount of money divided by 22,000 acre feet equates to an annual financing charge of $17,875 per acre foot. That’s just the financing charge, before any other operating and distribution costs. Nobody can pay that much for water.
It would be a big mistake to not take seriously the claims made by opponents of Sites. Over the past few months I’ve corresponded with representatives of the Sites Reservoir Authority, and also with representatives of the organization Friends of the River. This powerful organization is implacably opposed to the Sites Reservoir ever seeing the light of day. Here is what they told me in an email I received earlier this summer:
“The Sites Reservoir is estimated to divert on average approximately 255,000 acre-feet per year. This does not account for conveyance losses, evaporation, etc. Project yield would be less than this value… When asked by the Water Board to use the Water Board’s own tool to determine water availability, the output estimated annual diversions to only be 22k-59k acre-feet.”
The document where this claim is made was submitted before the State Water Resources Control Board in August 2024 and can be viewed here. On page 17, Table 1, “Summary of Estimated Volume and Frequency of Water Available for Appropriation and Potential Diversions Using Division’s WAA Tool,” the low scenario estimate of “Annual average potential diversion” is 22,000 acre feet. Since this estimate is using the State Water Resources Control Board’s own estimating tool, it is reasonable that the board will take this calculation seriously when considering the viability of the Sites project.
If there weren’t so much at stake, it would be merely interesting to watch how the Sites Project Authority, proven adept at working with all the “stakeholders,” will respond if a resolute and influential faction, entrenched within state water agencies, insist that the yield from Sites will never be sufficient to justify its cost. Because if they stick with numbers under 100,000 acre feet per year of average yield, and those numbers are accepted by a critical mass of stakeholders, they’re probably right. But are proponents of the Sites Reservoir willing to go toe-to-toe with their opponents? The data is there, depending on how it is interpreted.
The question of whether there would be enough water in the Sacramento River to fill Sites came up in 2022. As reported on 8/28/2022 in the San Francisco Chronicle, “California’s largest reservoir in nearly 50 years may be derailed by water shortages.” When this article came out, I had a look at the USGS data for CFS water volume for the Sacramento River around Colusa, which is roughly where the water for Sites will be sourced. As we may recall, 2022 was a very dry year. Here is how I summarized the data at the time:
“If one-fifth of the Sacramento River’s flow upstream at Colusa had been diverted, and only during the seven mostly dry months from October 2021 through April 2022, the massive 1.5 million acre foot Sites Reservoir could have been filled nearly half way to capacity. In just one season, during a drought.”
The USGS site offers publicly accessible records on “discharge, cubic feet per second” for the last 100 years. What is immediately obvious from viewing this data is that since the 1940s there is almost no trend upward or downward in rates of flow, only that the 1930s were much drier.
A detailed look at USGS data for the last 25 years shows robust flows: 16 years of frequent AF/day readings of over 80,000, and another four years where the flow often exceeded 60,000 AF/day. What about the most recent, our winter of 2024-25, an unremarkable season, neither notably wet nor excessively dry? There were 70 days when the flow exceeded 40,000 AF/day, including 40 days when the flow at Colusa exceeded 60,000 AF/day. Is it enough to support meaningful diversions into Sites and still send enough fresh water into the delta? Don’t forget that the Sacramento River at Colusa is upstream from the Feather River, which adds its powerful flow 40 miles downstream, as well as the American River, which joins the Sacramento River another 20 miles south.
One thing ought to be certain. There are weeks, if not months, every year including dry years, when the overall flow of water into and through the delta is well in excess of what is required for ecosystem health. The question is not if we have enough water to move south in abundance, only whether we get more of that water by building Sites, or come up with other more creative and cost effective ways to do it.
The Sites Reservoir may or may not be a cost-effective project. But we are only beginning to see the consequences of water rationing on our economy, our farms, our cities, and, ironically, on our ecosystems. This state needs water supply infrastructure to avoid catastrophes on multiple fronts. If Sites is not part of the solution, its opponents need to explain what solutions they will support. More rationing is not the answer.
EDWARD RING: Will the Sites Reservoir ever get built?
By Edward Ring, Director of Water and Energy Policy at the California Policy Center
The short answer is no. Never.
Most prominent recent news about Sites is the latest official cost estimate, which has risen to $6.8 billion. This should come as no surprise, but it changes the cost/benefit equation. While we offered some ROI data on Sites in early July, it’s useful to revisit this not only in light of the new costs, but to explore in further depth the other primary variable affecting ROI, which is how much water will actually end up in the hands of water contractors for agricultural and urban consumption.
It’s true of course that a cost increase from the officially recognized estimate of $3.9 billion to $6.8 billion is significant. For any calculation anyone has previously made, bump the numbers by 74 percent. That’s huge.
But even more significant, and not acknowledged nearly enough, is the endless war between proponents of the Sites Project, who steadfastly claim the reservoir will deliver an average annual yield of 250,000 acre feet per year to paying customers, and opponents, who argue that the average annual yield could fall as low as 22,000 acre feet per year.
Before going any further, imagine a scenario where the Sites Reservoir comes in on budget at a construction cost of $6.8 billion, but endless lawfare reduces the yield to what some of its opponents claim as a plausible outcome. A bond issued for 6.8 billion at 4 percent on a 30 year term will require an annual payment of $393 million. That amount of money divided by 22,000 acre feet equates to an annual financing charge of $17,875 per acre foot. That’s just the financing charge, before any other operating and distribution costs. Nobody can pay that much for water.
It would be a big mistake to not take seriously the claims made by opponents of Sites. Over the past few months I’ve corresponded with representatives of the Sites Reservoir Authority, and also with representatives of the organization Friends of the River. This powerful organization is implacably opposed to the Sites Reservoir ever seeing the light of day. Here is what they told me in an email I received earlier this summer:
“The Sites Reservoir is estimated to divert on average approximately 255,000 acre-feet per year. This does not account for conveyance losses, evaporation, etc. Project yield would be less than this value… When asked by the Water Board to use the Water Board’s own tool to determine water availability, the output estimated annual diversions to only be 22k-59k acre-feet.”
The document where this claim is made was submitted before the State Water Resources Control Board in August 2024 and can be viewed here. On page 17, Table 1, “Summary of Estimated Volume and Frequency of Water Available for Appropriation and Potential Diversions Using Division’s WAA Tool,” the low scenario estimate of “Annual average potential diversion” is 22,000 acre feet. Since this estimate is using the State Water Resources Control Board’s own estimating tool, it is reasonable that the board will take this calculation seriously when considering the viability of the Sites project.
If there weren’t so much at stake, it would be merely interesting to watch how the Sites Project Authority, proven adept at working with all the “stakeholders,” will respond if a resolute and influential faction, entrenched within state water agencies, insist that the yield from Sites will never be sufficient to justify its cost. Because if they stick with numbers under 100,000 acre feet per year of average yield, and those numbers are accepted by a critical mass of stakeholders, they’re probably right. But are proponents of the Sites Reservoir willing to go toe-to-toe with their opponents? The data is there, depending on how it is interpreted.
“If one-fifth of the Sacramento River’s flow upstream at Colusa had been diverted, and only during the seven mostly dry months from October 2021 through April 2022, the massive 1.5 million acre foot Sites Reservoir could have been filled nearly half way to capacity. In just one season, during a drought.”
The USGS site offers publicly accessible records on “discharge, cubic feet per second” for the last 100 years. What is immediately obvious from viewing this data is that since the 1940s there is almost no trend upward or downward in rates of flow, only that the 1930s were much drier.
A detailed look at USGS data for the last 25 years shows robust flows: 16 years of frequent AF/day readings of over 80,000, and another four years where the flow often exceeded 60,000 AF/day. What about the most recent, our winter of 2024-25, an unremarkable season, neither notably wet nor excessively dry? There were 70 days when the flow exceeded 40,000 AF/day, including 40 days when the flow at Colusa exceeded 60,000 AF/day. Is it enough to support meaningful diversions into Sites and still send enough fresh water into the delta? Don’t forget that the Sacramento River at Colusa is upstream from the Feather River, which adds its powerful flow 40 miles downstream, as well as the American River, which joins the Sacramento River another 20 miles south.
One thing ought to be certain. There are weeks, if not months, every year including dry years, when the overall flow of water into and through the delta is well in excess of what is required for ecosystem health. The question is not if we have enough water to move south in abundance, only whether we get more of that water by building Sites, or come up with other more creative and cost effective ways to do it.
The Sites Reservoir may or may not be a cost-effective project. But we are only beginning to see the consequences of water rationing on our economy, our farms, our cities, and, ironically, on our ecosystems. This state needs water supply infrastructure to avoid catastrophes on multiple fronts. If Sites is not part of the solution, its opponents need to explain what solutions they will support. More rationing is not the answer.
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